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This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences …
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I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises...
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Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective … than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by … simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500178
negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change … a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500234
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...
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We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279476