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Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2022

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458796

Managerial payoff and gift-exchange in the field

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2019

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064798

Do all new brooms sweep clean? : evidence for outside bank appointments

Kick, Thomas; Nehring, Inge; Schertler, Andrea - 2017

Banks in bad financial shape are more likely to appoint executive directors from the outside than those in good shape. It is, however, not clear whether all of these appointments necessarily lead to the desired turnaround. We analyze the performance effects of new board members with external...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011722661

What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts

Tykvová, Tereza - 2000

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428358

Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2017

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040

The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks : evidence from a field experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Schindler, David; … - 2018

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899201

The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487148

The efficacy of tournaments for non-routine team tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495030

Delegation, promotion, and manager selection

Häusinger, Benjamin - 2019

misalignment between managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker with the largest private …: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the … firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138859

Executive board composition and bank risk taking

Berger, Allen N.; Kick, Thomas; Schaeck, Klaus - 2012

Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009509092

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