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Corruption and the Composition of Public Expenditures: Evidence from OECD Countries

Hessami, Zohal - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper analyzes how corruption affects the composition of public expenditures. First, a two-stage rent …-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting is derived that captures both "political corruption" and "bureaucratic corruption". The … levels of corruption. The significance of these distortions is robust to a variety of specifications such as fixed effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684881

Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. There is significant over-dissipation in both stages of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258638

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259038

The Welfare Costs of Rent-Seeking: A Methodologically Individualist & Subjectivist Revision

Makovi, Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

Gordon Tullock is recognized for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011234836

Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

Amegashie, J. Atsu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619655

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224

Behavior in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Standard theoretical prediction is that rational economic agents participating in rent-seeking contests should engage in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly efforts. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109372

Behavioral Dimensions of Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The standard theoretical description of rent-seeking contests is that of rational individuals or groups engaging in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly effort. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted in the models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111074