Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Sheremeta, Roman |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | rent-seeking | contest | asymmetric equilibrium | multiple equilibria |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Source: |
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Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
Chowdhury, Subhashish Modak, (2010)
-
Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish Modak, (2010)
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A generalized Tullock contest and the existence of multiple equilibria
Chowdhury, Subhashish Modak, (2009)
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Strategically Equivalent Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish, (2014)
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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Chowdhury, Subhasish, (2014)
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Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes
Chowdhury, Subhasish, (2013)
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