constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies …, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition …. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad …

responds more to increases in shareholders' return performance than to decreases. Further, this asymmetry is stronger when …

respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of … policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in … though they could have done otherwise, to impose antitakeover protections on shareholders, who did not appear to favor them …

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

In this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality. We analyze the hospital sector where … management quality - measured using a new survey tool - is strongly correlated with financial and clinical outcomes such as … a greater number of neighboring hospitals) is positively correlated with increased management quality, and this …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …