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Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets
Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1995
experiments ruled out gift exchange or reciprocity motives, that is, subjects could not reciprocate for a gift. This paper reports … results indicate that reciprocity motives may indeed be capable of driving a competitive experimental market permanently away …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764177
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Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game
Okada, Akiro; Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1999
reported in the literature on 2- person ultimatum bargaining experiments, negative reciprocity (i.e. punishment of unfair … offers) plays a crucial role in decision making. The hypothesis that selfishness and anticipated negative reciprocity by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764158
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Wage Bargaining and Management Opposition in the Presence of Productivity Gains and Organization Costs
Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1997
Empirical studies have emphasized three important factors in firm-labor relationships: (a) organization costs of workers, (b) management opposition against workers' organizing drives, (c) the possibility of productivity enhancing effects due to "voice/response" reasons. In this paper the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823247
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Weakening the Weak may Harm the Strong. A Bargaining Model where Opting-In is Costly
Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1995
The opportunity to bargain often causes costs for at least one party in many economic situations, e.g. wage negotiations, joint ventures or interfirm cooperation. This paper studies such situations. A "strong" and a "weak" player have to agree how to divide the produced surplus. The "weak"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764155