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Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...
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An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.
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Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346460
An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349188
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...
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