Consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity-setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior, occasionally experimenting with some small probability. In this context, it is shown that the unique long-run outcome of the process has all firms playing Walrasian, i.e.,...

In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1991) where the population is partitioned into disjoint groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher...

In a preceding companion paper, a static model of individual decision making was proposed that, due to imprecise perceptions, induces simple and inertial behavior at equilibrium ("status-quo optimal") points. This paper addresses two complementary issues. First, it studies the learning dynamics...

This paper investigates an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection in which agents are randomly paired every period to play some general symrnetric game of common interest (i.e., a game where some strategy profile Pareto- dominates al1 other configurations). Along the process, players tend...

The paper studies an inter-temporal market context in which firms innovate, imitate, and compete in quantities and technological choices each period. Potential entrants enter if there are profitable opportunities; incumbent firms exit when they go bankrupt. The key aspect of the model is that...

We study a market for a homogeneous good in which firms adjust theirproduction decisions on the basis of imitation, learning from own experience, and local experimentation.For any fixed set of firms (more than one), long run behavior settles on a symmetric marginal-cost pricingequlibrium. When...

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to playa coordination game and can adjust both their strategy and location. Their decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to...

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model for (anonymous) cooperation where a large population of agents are re-matched every period to playa Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hold a certain common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of population-average...

This paper studies a strategic model of growth in which firms' accumulation and technological decisions are subject to both friction and external effects. This gives rise to a wide multiplicity of equilibrium behavior, which is consistent with quite different performances of the economy (e.g.,...

This paper introduces expectations into the framework of evolutionary games. On the one hand, (myopic) players are assumed to behave optimally according to the expectations they hold at each point of the process. On the other hand, expectations themselves are continuously updated according to...