An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. It follows that for a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities have...

As a result of advances in ICT-services, transportation, and local development, among others, an increasing number of destinations is competing to attract both national and international visitors. Globalisation requires destinations to increase their competitiveness or risk losing out on tourist...

This paper introduces a new measure to approach the accessibility of places in the frame of the digital economy. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the Internet are not equally spread around places and this heterogeneity affects spatial configuration. Despite the wide societal...

"Robot cars" are cars that allow for automated driving. They can drive closer together than human driven "normal cars" and thereby raise road capacity. Obtaining a robot car instead of a normal car can also be expected to lower the userś value of time losses (VOT), because travel time can be...

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...