Showing 1 - 10 of 118
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366550
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2005) introduced a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that this generalized state-space model arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343960
to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909260
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371074
conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366530
We analyze a rating agency's incentives to distort ratings in a model with a monopolistic profit maximizing rating agency, a continuum of heterogeneous firms, and a competitive market of risk-neutral investors. Firms sell bonds, the value of a firm's bond is known to the firm and observable by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345759
and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395
output are provided. While the treatment conveyed no additional material information and left the incentive system unchanged …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285314
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868