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Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different … adjustments. The evidence supports a cognitive approach to learning. -- Learning ; Auctions ; Fair Division Games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102
In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division … price expectations and the efficiency rates. -- auctions ; fair division games ; bid function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405
qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than … the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559