A single, long-run player plays a simultaneous-move stage game against a sequence of opponents who only play once, but observe all previous play. If there is a positive prior probability that the long-run player will always play the pure strategy he would most like to commit himself to (his...

In a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play that...

This paper compares two different models in a common environment. The first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot sell short. The second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so much that they would want to default, but is...

The authors study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations. Players are matched.at random to play a fixed extensive-form game and each player observes the realized...

In this paper we study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses both models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable...