Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that...

We exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral viewpoints. Taken...

The authors present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that have as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility case, the...

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all...