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In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is $U(I,a)=-e^{-k(I-a)}$, then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk...
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