In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is $U(I,a)=-e^{-k(I-a)}$, then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk...

Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers a constant to an uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose expected utility (EU) version is Arrow and Pratt’s more risk aversion concept, will be studied in the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model. Necessary condition...

Following Aumann and Serrano (J Polit Econ 116:810–836, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2008</CitationRef>) who characterize by axioms an index of riskiness defined on absolute returns, we characterize a new index of riskiness defined on relative returns. Both indices are characterized by a similar principle of duality between risk and...</citationref>

Uncertainty has an almost negligible impact on project value in the standard economic model. I show that a comprehensive evaluation of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude changes this picture fundamentally. The illustration of this result relies on the discount rate, which is the crucial...