This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$k\ge 1$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendation to organizers of auctions is to conduct...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then...

A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of...

We study a two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player’s marginal values for the prizes are...