Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$x$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>x</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$y$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>y</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont...

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

We characterize the family of efficient, consistent, and strategy-proof rules in house allocation problems. These rules follow an endowment inheritance and trade procedure as in Pápai’s hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai in Econometrica <Emphasis Type="Bold">68, 1403–1433, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">2000</CitationRef>) and closely resemble Ergin’s...</citationref></emphasis>

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function....

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternatives” condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (“Condorcet...