We analyze sequential and simultaneous price setting under a mixed duopoly with homogeneous products and symmetric quadratic cost functions. When public firm is the follower, there exists the case that the equilibrium price is highest of all timings.

This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

We analyze sequential and simultaneous price setting under a mixed duopoly with homogeneous products and symmetric quadratic cost functions. When public firm is the follower, there exists the case that the equilibrium price is highest of all timings.

This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

This paper analyzes a mixed duopoly in which a public firm and a (possibly partially) foreign-owned firm choose their capacity scales before competing in quantities. We show that the private firm chooses over-capacity, as in previous literature, except if it is completely foreign-owned. In this...

This study aims to investigate the impact of privatization on the degree of cooperation and competition in a mixed duopoly market. In this market, one semipublic firm and one private firm determine the level of two types of effort: the cooperative effort made to enlarge the total market size and...

We investigate the privatization policy of an industry where the production process generates emissions. We show that the high degree of negative externality leads to production substitution from the public firm to private firms. Moreover, we show that, if the degree of negative externality is...

In the presence of output subsidization, the optimal output subsidy is identical and profits, output and social welfare are also identical irrespective of whether (i)a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms or (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all firms, public and...

We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the...

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long-run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit-maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non-pure profit...