Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly under Price Competition

This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the literature assuming quantity competition.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos ; Garzón, María Begoña
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2007, 26, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Heterogeneous Products

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise ; D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094775