It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some...

This note considers the effect of the cost of voting on voters' welfare and their incentive to reduce voting costs in a simple model in which two single-voter teams participate to win an election from two alternatives. When each voter''s benefit of winning is his private information but...

We show that in any 2x2 game in which a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, the probability distribution that this equilibrium assigns to player i is either the same or the mirror image of the distribution that the minimax regret criterion defines for player j. Sharper results that...

This paper considers a contest in which two identical players participate to compete for an indivisible prize. It is shown that, in the presence of incomplete information, the player favored by the status quo tie-breaking rule may be less likely to get the prize than his competitor, even though,...

A general class of adaptive strategies in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) may be extended to conditional strategies in the same way as smooth fictitious play in Fudenberg and Levine (1999). We show that a generalized version of universal conditional consistency (UCC) obtains for conditional adaptive...

We extend the model of friendship networks developed by Brueckner (2006) in two ways. First, we extend the level of indirect benefits by incorporating benefits from up to three links and explore its implication for the socially optimal and individual effort levels. Next, we generalize the...

We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated version of a standard auction with a continuum of types. Because of the lack of efficiency results in this setting the literature has focused on determining and comparing benchmarks on how well bidders can collude. Aoyagi (2003) has shown that the...

This paper explores the formation of stable network structures in a model with public goods. The multiplicity of equilibria in the non-cooperative formulation of network formation games brings out further difficulties in analyzing stability of network structures. This contrasts with the...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (Review of Economic Studies, 1998, hereafter CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitation process, containing their...

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information...