This paper presents a two-country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power, cost-reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.

Two results are shown about the free-entry equilibrium in a Cournot market with asymmetric firms and imperfectly substituting goods. First, only one technology will survive in the production of each good. Second, some good(s) may not be produced. Specifically, we show that in a two-good model...

By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned...

This paper seeks to show that even though a product market competitor holds the least cost input production technology, it may outsource its input production to an independent input producer and buy inputs from the firm at a higher price instead of producing inputs in-house for itself....

In contrast to the predictions of conventional economic theory, it is well documented that similar workers receive wages positively correlated with the size of the firm employing them. To explain these findings we augment the Waldman (1984) framework by adding a size variable and construct a...

This note analyzes the differences between strategic trade and domestic competition policies to regulate a unionized monopoly. In the presence of an industry-wide union, the entry of a domestic competitor does not reduce labor market distortions, while strategic trade policy reduces both labor...

In this paper I investigate the relationship between unionization and the size of the informal economy. Using a cross-country panel data for 30 countries over the period from 1960 to 2009, I find a strong and robust negative correlation between unionization and the size of the informal economy.

This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in a multi-unit firm in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria, considering both simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate...

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between parties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union's power is not too high.

After the stabilization plan of 1994, and trade liberalization, the Brazilian inflation rate ped from two figures monthly to a single one annually. Several large capitalization firms began adhering to the Annual Social Audit disclosures, a series of internal and external indicators mostly...