This study considers the anti-competitive effect of fixed-fee pricing, such as the one seen in a recent antitrust case in Japan. We show that fixed-fee pricing has stronger exclusionary effect than the per-use pricing's exclusionary effect. However, the restriction on usage of fixed-fee pricing...

Most of the literature on price discrimination in input markets has focused on linear per-unit prices used by a monopolist supplier. Here, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium two-part tariffs, which can allow the monopolist supplier to obtain (at a minimum) the profit that...

This paper investigates optimal licensing in a mixed oligopoly with a foreign firm. It is the first to compare licensing by means of a fixed fee and by means of a royalty when the innovator is a public firm. In contrast to a private oligopoly, we show that license via a fixed fee is superior to...

In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.

This paper uses a bivariate probit model to analyze firms' decisions to impose regimes of exclusive dealing and/or exclusive territories with their distributors. We employ a panel data set of manufacturing firms (from 1990 to 2005) that contains information about such vertical restraints. Firms...

Shaffer (1991) shows that a multiproduct monopolist selling differentiated products through a unique retailer cannot earn monopoly profit using brand specific two-part tariffs and that full-line forcing restores monopoly power. We extend this analysis to more general contracts and shows that...

Melnik et al. [Melnik, A., Shy, Oz, Stenbacka, R. Assessing market dominance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68, 63-72] have proposed a new statistic to assess market dominance. In this comment we expand their discussion of certain mathematical properties in their analysis and...

We study the effect of more information of firms about consumers' preferences on collusion sustainability within a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. We show that the increase of information may increase or decrease collusion sustainability, depending on the type of information involved (shared...

We analyze the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in repeated oligopoly models in which both fines and detection probabilities depend on the cartel price. Such fines reflect actual guidelines. Inspections based on monitoring of market prices imply endogenous detection probabilities. Without...

This paper investigates the effects of exclusive territories in the presence of upstream competition. We consider the vertical dealings among two upstream firms and four downstream firms and find that exclusive territories may be more beneficial for consumers and more harmful for producers than...