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On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

Serrano, Roberto - In: Economics Bulletin 29 (2009) 3, pp. 2350-2360

Watson (2007) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex …-forcing contracts do not con- stitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renego- tiation and with ex …-post renegotiation. Moreover, taking a full implemen- tation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562810

Condorcet's Paradox and the Median Voter Theorem for Randomized Social Choice

Aziz, Haris - In: Economics Bulletin 35 (2015) 1, pp. 745-749

Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212876

An experimental study of e-mail games with strategic information transmission and communication cost

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2921-2929

unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are … Rubinstein's model by replacing automatic information transmission with the strategic one, or by introducing communication costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278536

A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples

Salgado-Torres, Alfredo - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 3, pp. 2044-2055

We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism in market with couples called One Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can be attained in Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast with previous results, we find that the mechanism may attain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278561

Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology: comment

Tsay, Min-Hung - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 2, pp. 1680-1686

In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278578

The Shapley value for fuzzy games: TU games approach

Liao, Yu-Hsien - In: Economics Bulletin 33 (2013) 1, pp. 192-197

In this note we investigate the Shapley value for fuzzy games proposed by Hwang and Liao (2009). We show that there exists a transferable-utility (TU) decomposition games that can be adopted to characterize the fuzzy Shapley value, i.e., the fuzzy Shapley value consists of the Shapley value of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278583

Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining

Clark, Derek J; Pereau, Jean-Christophe - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 3, pp. 2522-2529

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278588

Supply of Dairy Products in Developing Countries

Jung, Hanjoon M.; Burki, Abid A; Khan, Mushtaq A - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 3213-3223

Dairy products in developing countries are characterized by two properties, namely, perishability and short-periodic production. These properties are so unique that conventional studies in agricultural economics or in industrial organization might not explain the dairy product supply well....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278600

Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes

Hirai, Shumei - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2744-2751

This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278614

Do I care if you know I betrayed you?

Cox, James C; Li, Danyang - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2839-2848

In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a modifed trust game. We introduced a coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees in the trust game. The realized outcome of the coin flip determines the productivity of trust. By varying trustors' ability to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278628

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