Gómez-Rúa (2011, SERIEÂ’s) considers a river divided into n segments. In each segment there is exactly one agent, who releases some kind of residue into the water. An environmental authority must share the total cost of cleaning the river network among all the agents. In this paper we...

This note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsatí...

We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium....

This paper studies the problem of the long-run preferences distribution in a large population using an evolutionary approach. Special attention is given to the investigation of the property of the mixed population equilibria, in which materialists and reciprocators coexist. Some of the players...

This paper identifies a class of symmetric coordination games in which the presence of envious people helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. In these games, the selected equilibrium is always risk-dominant. We also find that envious preferences are evolutionary...

We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankindâ€, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect...

In this note we introduce an egalitarian solution, called the dual egalitarian solution, that is the natural counterpart of the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). We prove, among others, that for a convex game the egalitarian solution coincides with the dual egalitarian solution for...

This paper studies the problem of the long-run preferences distribution in a large population using an evolutionary approach. Special attention is given to the investigation of the property of the mixed population equilibria, in which materialists and reciprocators coexist. Some of the players...

This paper identifies a class of symmetric coordination games in which the presence of envious people helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. In these games, the selected equilibrium is always risk-dominant. We also find that envious preferences are evolutionary...

In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.