Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations

This note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsatí (2011). We show that under quadratic utility functions, the unique quota rule that maximizes collective surplus ranges from 80% to 95%.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cardona, Daniel ; Ponsatí, Clara
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 33.2013, 1, p. 278-288
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	One-dimensional bargaining \| single-peak preferences \| quota rules \| collective surplus

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D6 - Welfare Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278848