In this paper, we discuss a scenario in capital structure where two divisional managers compete for capital from a firm for their projects in a perfect information setting. We consider verifiable profits and study take-it-or-leave-it contracts where the managers ask for capital from the firm...

This paper analyzes mergers incentives in an asymmetric mixed oligopoly consisting of two identical private firms and one public firm. It is shown that when there is a technological gap between the public and private firms, both of them will want to merge when the public firm is inefficient and...

This paper explores the asymmetric adjustment speed of gasoline price in twelve European Union (EU) countries transmitted directly in a single stage formulation. The empirical results shed new light on the taxation effect and its role to the price asymmetry nexus, pointing that in many EU...

Research papers on innovation activity share the view that whenever an invention is made available by a startup innovator, getting its ownership by acquisition is beneficial for incumbent firms. In this note, I show by means of an example that there are some circumstances in which accomodating...

This paper studies how the strategic interaction between a specialized communication platform and two firms, competing in prices and advertising efforts, determines the equilibrium advertising fee and the pattern of competition between sellers. We show that the link between information and price...

This note analyzes the impact of habit formation in media markets on the behavior of a two-sided newspaper platform. Using a simple dynamic approach we find that habit formation (as well as indirect network effects) lead to higher quantities and profits. Price setting, however, strongly depends...

By adjusting the strength of IPRs protection, the government can change the extent of knowledge spillovers in R&D. A large spillover rate helps to improve the productivity of the less efficient firms and save on the overall production costs. But, at the same time, it reduces the innovator's...

Kutlu (2009, “Price discrimination in Stackelberg competitionâ€, Journal of Industrial Economics) shows that the Stackelberg leader sells to the highest value consumers and only the Stackelberg follower practises price discrimination. We show that this result is not robust if the...

We reconsider Banerjee and Lin [International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003] by investigating the role of spillovers (or informational flows) for the profitability of input-price contracts in a vertically related industry. We show that spillovers influence the relative magnitude of...

We introduce merging strategies and endogenous MQS, borrowed from Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), in Scarpa (1998). MQS induces the low-quality firm to exit the market and leads to a monopoly arising from the bilateral merger of the high-quality firms