Within an environment of sequential innovations, real world evidence suggests that the licensing decision of the initial patent can occur either before or after the R&D investment of the follow-on invention. The possibility of licensing after the follow-on invention exists due to the presence of...

In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the followers receive...

We characterize the optimal policy-mix towards R&D activity and output production in the simultaneous moves mixed and private duopolies, as well as in the Stackelberg mixed duopoly. Our findings suggest that the government will opt for implementing jointly a tax on R&D with a subsidy on output...

In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the followers receive...

We characterize the optimal policy-mix towards R&D activity and output production in the simultaneous moves mixed and private duopolies, as well as in the Stackelberg mixed duopoly. Our findings suggest that the government will opt for implementing jointly a tax on R&D with a subsidy on output...