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We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278755
that a simple majority rule required to break global cooperation guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836007
This paper uses dynamic games with complete and perfect information in solution of water conflict in Central Asia. The benefits and costs of the countries for their actions are modelled as payoffs for decision-makers within the frame of game theory concept. The equilibrium increasing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629347
The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278852
For simple economic models of transfrontier pollution, Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) have offered a formula for transfers to sustain international cooperation on a voluntary basis and which deter coalitionnal free-riding under some reasonable behaviours of countries not in the coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836166
game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and … sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize … axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010726673
-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008625861
We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 x m or m x 2 assignment games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672354
It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent … preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as … housing markets with a core containing more than one matching. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110775
For simple economic models of transfrontier pollution, Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) have offered a formula for transfers to sustain international cooperation on a voluntary basis and which deter coalitionnal free-riding under some reasonable behaviours of countries not in the coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094644