We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we …

that a simple majority rule required to break global cooperation guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations …

game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and … sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize … axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity …

and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included …

Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a … each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core … allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his …

In this paper we study the equity core (Selten, 1978) and compare it with the core. A payoff vector is in the equity … core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a given weight system and, in this way, give … more to each member than the amount he or she receives in the payoff vector. We show that the equity core is a compact …

-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the …