This note analyzes the impact of indirect network effects in emerging two-sided markets on prices, quantities, profits and market entry assuming market enlargement induced by indirect network effects. Only if indirect network effects are small, the conventional results of market entry apply,...

We study a Hotelling location game where media platforms compete with the same content in two separate markets. The findings show that media platforms may provide less differentiated content if the non-negativity constraint on prices is binding in at least one market. Moreover, content...

The impact of input price changes on industry concentration in a Cournot oligopoly depends on the type of firm heterogeneity and on the curvature of the demand function. Firms might be heterogeneous in their ability to use the input undergoing the price change, or in their ability to use...

This paper explores the asymmetric adjustment speed of gasoline price in twelve European Union (EU) countries transmitted directly in a single stage formulation. The empirical results shed new light on the taxation effect and its role to the price asymmetry nexus, pointing that in many EU...

The paper examines the differential exercise of market power over the business cycle in the context of selected sectors in the Canadian manufacturing industry during the 1992-1/2007-4 period. In particular, empirical implications of non-collusive models previously explored by Wilson and Reynolds...

Feenstra and Ma (2008) develop a monopolistic competition model where firms choose their optimal product scope by balancing the profits from a new variety against the costs of “cannibalizing” sales of existing varieties. While more productive firms always have a higher market share, there is...

Most of the literature on price discrimination in input markets has focused on linear per-unit prices used by a monopolist supplier. Here, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium two-part tariffs, which can allow the monopolist supplier to obtain (at a minimum) the profit that...

In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution...