It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some...

This note considers the effect of the cost of voting on voters' welfare and their incentive to reduce voting costs in a simple model in which two single-voter teams participate to win an election from two alternatives. When each voter''s benefit of winning is his private information but...

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (Review of Economic Studies, 1998, hereafter CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitation process, containing their...

This paper examines the lack of information flow in the credit markets of developing countries. We show that the miscoordination among financial intermediaries might explain why lenders don't share their information about the borrowers. The competition effect of more transparency in the market...

We extend the model of friendship networks developed by Brueckner (2006) in two ways. First, we extend the level of indirect benefits by incorporating benefits from up to three links and explore its implication for the socially optimal and individual effort levels. Next, we generalize the...

This paper explores the formation of stable network structures in a model with public goods. The multiplicity of equilibria in the non-cooperative formulation of network formation games brings out further difficulties in analyzing stability of network structures. This contrasts with the...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (Review of Economic Studies, 1998, hereafter CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitation process, containing their...

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information...

This paper examines the lack of information flow in the credit markets of developing countries. We show that the miscoordination among financial intermediaries might explain why lenders don't share their information about the borrowers. The competition effect of more transparency in the market...