Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

We experimentally examined several versions of Rubinstein (1989)'s e-mail game in the laboratory. He shows that, in the unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of...

We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism in market with couples called One Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can be attained in Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast with previous results, we find that the mechanism may attain...

In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.

In this note we investigate the Shapley value for fuzzy games proposed by Hwang and Liao (2009). We show that there exists a transferable-utility (TU) decomposition games that can be adopted to characterize the fuzzy Shapley value, i.e., the fuzzy Shapley value consists of the Shapley value of...

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution...

Dairy products in developing countries are characterized by two properties, namely, perishability and short-periodic production. These properties are so unique that conventional studies in agricultural economics or in industrial organization might not explain the dairy product supply well....

This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove...

In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a modifed trust game. We introduced a coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees in the trust game. The realized outcome of the coin flip determines the productivity of trust. By varying trustors' ability to...

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely...