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Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 1, pp. 90-93

We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament incentive scheme. Our treatments vary the prize spread. The data highlights that honesty is more pronounced when the prize spread is small.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041747

Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight

Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Games and economic behavior 70 (2010) 2, pp. 472-488

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008715479

Overconfidence can improve an agent's relative and absolute performance in contests

Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C.; Wickhorst, Hanke - In: Economics letters 110 (2011) 3, pp. 193-197

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008843247

Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Games and economic behavior 63 (2008) 1, pp. 366-369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008221168

Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Wichardt, Philipp C.; Schunk, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 103 (2009) 1, pp. 33-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008231982

On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

Carlsson, Hans; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Economics letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 504-508

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009967267

Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties

Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 709-714

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009830648

How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective

Seel, Christian; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Economics letters 115 (2012) 1, pp. 111-114

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009838645

Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Wichardt, Philipp C.; Schunk, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 103 (2009) 1, pp. 33-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008892204

On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

Carlsson, Hans; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 504-507

In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572218