We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

If a positive proportion of traders are naive (i.e., honestly reveal their types and bid/ask truthfully), then efficiency increases in a double auction with preplay communication. Presence of naive traders induces strategic traders to decrease the misrepresentation of their private information.

We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.

We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the...

Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned...

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more...

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...