A test of the predictions of Dana’s (2001) model of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty using ticket price data from Major League Baseball shows that ticket price dispersion changes systematically with demand uncertainty, verifying the predictions of the model.

This paper analyses the disparity regarding the sign of the investment–uncertainty relationship in models of investment under symmetric adjustment costs. That sign is determined by the shape of the profit function, which is related to the nature of demand shocks.

This paper sets up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost-reducing R&D and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and an upfront fee) contract. It is...

In the dominant firm-competitive fringe model, where firms purchase input from a common supplier via two-part tariff contracts, we demonstrate that countervailing power may be neutral. Unlike Chen (2003), more countervailing power may not lead to lower consumer prices.

We analyze dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities, focusing on pricing under negative externalities. We also attempt to generalize models in the previous literature, which encompass both negative and positive externalities, by incorporating a consumer’s discount factor for...

This paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third-degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous. The results provide rich implications for antitrust policy.

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms.

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus...

This letter addresses the second-degree price discrimination issue when a monopolized product is tied with environmental quality. The monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers.

We show that the price-setting subgame in the classic Hotelling’s model (1929) with the linear transport costs has the unique equilibrium solution for all location pairs under the assumption that duopolists secure themselves against being driven out of the market by undercutting. In contrast...