I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium).

In this paper we consider the sensitivity of functional form in the popular panel data stochastic frontier model proposed by Battese and Battese and Coelli (BC, 1992). We demonstrate that adopting the (t−T) efficiency functional form used by BC can, in a model which allows for firm specific...

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.

Existing hedonic methods cannot be easily adapted to estimate willingness to pay for product characteristics when willingness to pay depends on a very large basket of goods. We show how to marry these methods with revealed preference arguments to estimate bounds on willingness to pay using data...

This paper studies the discriminatory pricing of an intermediate good and compares two models with a different timing of investments undertaken by the downstream firms, before or after the upstream monopolist sets the input prices. When the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher...

We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in “large” partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payoff vectors at which there is no overdemanded...

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining,...

Theoretical explanations for price stickiness used in businesses cycle models are diverse (e.g., information processing delays, rational inattention and fair pricing), with each theory resulting in a different implication for inflation dynamics. Using an autoregressive conditional binomial...

We demonstrate that the Varian (1980) model of sales has a unique Nash equilibrium when firms incur costly advertising to compete for informed consumers. The equilibrium is symmetric. In particular, with costly advertising, the asymmetric equilibria highlighted by Baye et al. (1992) do not arise.

This paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m≥1 identical prizes, which employ an auction-like rule to determine the winners. In most papers that investigate such models, participation by precisely m+1 players is associated with players having complete information about...