Pension systems often entail some compulsory saving over which individuals have some degree of choice in terms of the pension plan in which to invest. We analyse whether the choice between alternative plans is affected by the presence of liquidity constraints during working life and we prove...

Financing government spending through lump sum taxes does not distort capital when markets are complete but tends to increase precautionary savings under market incompleteness. Using flat consumption taxes instead leaves precautionary savings unaffected, provided certain conditions on utility...

This paper shows that grid-based numerical solutions to models with incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty are sensitive to the number and placement of grid points in the aggregate asset holdings direction. Higher moments of the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings can be...

A simple Monte Carlo calibration approach is implemented in a GE model with uninsurable employment risk to quantitatively study the optimal replacement rate of a public unemployment insurance (UI) scheme. The optimal UI sampling distribution is found to be bimodal.

We reappraise the robustness of sunspot effects in overlapping-generations models. Azariadis’s well-known example economies have stationary, deterministic fundamentals (preferences, technologies, and endowments), yet sunspots affect multiple equilibria. And those equilibria are robust to...

We show that a non-Bayesian learning procedure leads to very permissive implementation results concerning the efficient allocation of resources in a dynamic environment where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of...

“Overbidding” with respect to risk-neutral Nash predictions in first-price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature. One possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities, which causes...

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.