Showing 1 - 10 of 23
We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal’s contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member’s bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041830
We offer a model that combines a knowledge based organizational structure with progressive learning of employees’ talent. We show that higher span of control is associated with better selected managers, higher wages, higher probability to be promoted, and higher turn-over in the early career...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208467
In Uttar Pradesh, teams of four are engaged to dig soil under the NREGA programme. In one treatment spouses work together; in the other treatment they work in separate teams. Working with spouses is associated with significantly higher output.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688094
This paper analyzes the impact of wage comparisons among inequity-averse agents on optimal incentive intensities in a linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks that differ in that only individual production causes wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041848
Consider an environment such as a political election where a principal requires the completion of multiple tasks, but an agent can only be rewarded with a hire/fire decision rather than an endogenously chosen monetary payment. When the principal hires a single agent to perform multiple tasks,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208450
This paper investigates how compensation structure affects performance in a simple but effort-consuming task. In this experimental study, the subjects were asked to multiply two-digit numbers for 40 min and were paid using either a linear (with different pay for performance sensitivities) or a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933299
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms’ job offer and workers’ job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930730
Since 1995, labor economists have reported on the income disparities between individuals who engage in same-sex behavior and those that do not. Many of these papers report a significant wage penalty, while others find no effect, but few look at the trend over time. We find, using National Health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729479
Drawing on data from 916 Division 1 men’s college hockey games played during a recent six-year period in the Western Collegiate Hockey Association (WCHA), we find evidence that positive momentum within 458 two-game series does not exist when controlling for team quality. We find that neither...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743719
This paper contains a proof that under one testable condition a measure of economic mobility formed by the ratio of permanent to total variance employing the methods of Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) is equivalent to the Shorrocks R constructed with a Theil General Entropy Index.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678810