Showing 1 - 10 of 95
This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784968
We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939488
The objective of a leniency program is to reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses his behavior or cooperates with the public authority’s investigation. Constructing a model in which the detection probability varies over time, Harrington (2008) pointed out that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743731
We reexamine the association between poverty, the middle class, and institutional outcomes using a newly developed cross-country panel dataset containing detailed information on the distribution of income and expenditure. When the size of the middle class increases (measured as the proportion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594090
Most quantitative tools for assessing competitive effects of mergers rely heavily on recapture ratios (also known as aggregate diversion ratios). Recapture ratios measure the proportion of customers switching away from a product that is captured by other products within the market rather than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932324
We show that, in general, consistent estimates of cost pass-through are not obtained from reduced-form regressions of price on cost. We derive a formal approximation for the bias that arises even under standard orthogonality conditions. We provide guidance on the conditions under which bias may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906361
The two central pricing rules contained in most antitrust laws are prohibitions of below-cost pricing and prohibitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594082
Harrington (2004) shows that conspirators can have incentives to maintain high prices after the cartel’s discovery to reduce damages they are likely to pay. We exploit the existence of a discovered retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in the province of Quebec to test this theory. The empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594145
This note investigates the effects of a large horizontal merger on the shape of the 1-to-12 h price menus offered by parking garages in Paris. The merger caused low-end prices to increase proportionally more than high-end prices. This results in larger discounts on longer hours and hence in more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594159
In a linear oligopoly model with antitrust enforcement, the optimal cartel price converges to the competitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597211