We examine a housing market with price controls and show how the allocation problem can be solved through a price system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient and stable outcome.

This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of...

We provide extensions of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) result when the seller has value for the object above the minimum value of the buyers. The result may fail. We show that the seller does better with more participation and some exclusion than the optimal exclusion of buyers of low value...

We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.

We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents’ decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained...

In the matching with contracts literature, three well-known conditions (from stronger to weaker)–substitutes, unilateral substitutes (US), and bilateral substitutes (BS)–have proven to be critical. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of them by separately axiomatizing the gap between...

I propose a simple method to nonparametrically estimate the utility function in first-price, sealed-bid auctions when bidders’ participation is exogenous. Using a pair of bid densities, each for a different number of bidders, I establish a contraction mapping that converges to the true utility...

In a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery–in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price–is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds....

This article proposes a nonlinear scoring rule which transforms multiple attributes of a bid into comparable dimensionless ones. Practically, the buyer can use it to select the most competitive winner. For risk-neutral bidders, we characterize a symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium and find that...

Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.