We build on Mason and Weeds’ (2010) model of duopoly investment under uncertainty by allowing high initial values of the profit shock as in Huisman and Kort (1999). Persistent first-mover advantage increases the likelihood of immediate simultaneous investment. In contrast with previous models...

Consider the Hotelling linear spatial duopoly with firm uncertainty over the consumer mean. As uncertainty about the mean grows relative to the dispersion of consumers, competitive locations become socially optimal. A limit result for discontinuous, log-concave densities is also established.

The relationship between fiscal and financial euro area indicators and sovereign yield spreads has changed after the start of the financial crisis. Increased financial volatility has magnified the impact of fiscal conditions as drivers of sovereign risk, has widened the set of macroeconomic...

We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait...

I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium....

We show that in a preemption game of entry into a Cournot market, increasing the number of competitors beyond duopoly does not bring forward the time of first entry. We also show that all entries, except the first one, occur earlier than socially optimal.

There are N projects of unknown quality. We solve the problem of choosing the best n<N projects from this set when there is a finite time to allocate to learning their quality.

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and...