We build on Mason and Weeds’ (2010) model of duopoly investment under uncertainty by allowing high initial values of the profit shock as in Huisman and Kort (1999). Persistent first-mover advantage increases the likelihood of immediate simultaneous investment. In contrast with previous models...

Consider the Hotelling linear spatial duopoly with firm uncertainty over the consumer mean. As uncertainty about the mean grows relative to the dispersion of consumers, competitive locations become socially optimal. A limit result for discontinuous, log-concave densities is also established.

The relationship between fiscal and financial euro area indicators and sovereign yield spreads has changed after the start of the financial crisis. Increased financial volatility has magnified the impact of fiscal conditions as drivers of sovereign risk, has widened the set of macroeconomic...

We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait...

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of conflict effort.

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

We study the provision of a public good in a social network where links are directed, i.e., the information flows one way. Our results relate, through stochastic dominance, the equilibrium outcome of such a process with the out-degree distribution of the network.

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s...