Similar Search Results

Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 2, pp. 223-225

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076534

How economic rewards affect cooperation reconsidered

Kagel, John H.; Schley, Dan R. - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 1, pp. 124-127

Recent studies suggest that payoffs in cents, compared to dollars, produce less defection in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We are unable to replicate these findings with conventional economic procedures or in a direct replication.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702773

Does context promote higher-level thinking in the beauty contest?

Luccasen, R. Andrew - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 3, pp. 421-424

Some problems are more easily solved if context is provided. A stylized result from beauty contest experiments is that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729476

Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: An experimental study

Qin, Xiangdong; Zhang, Fangzhou - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 55-59

We experimentally study clock auctions to dissolve partnerships jointly owned by two players. Subjects are found to deviate systematically from the Nash equilibrium. We explain the bidding behaviour in terms of risk aversion and/or non-standard utility theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662398

Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles

Bühren, Christoph; Frank, Björn; Krabel, Stefan; … - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 356-358

We introduce a competitive framing in the mini-ultimatum game utilizing chess puzzles. Therein, our chess playing participants accept low offers significantly more often compared to a neutral framing. We conclude that in familiar competitive surroundings egoistic behavior is more acceptable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041685

Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?

Ratan, Anmol - In: Economics Letters 126 (2015) C, pp. 119-121

“Overbidding” with respect to risk-neutral Nash predictions in first-price auction experiments has been consistently … reported in the literature. One possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a … experiments, which suggest that displaying probabilities could reduce the extent of overbidding. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189538

Are leniency programs too generous?

Sauvagnat, Julien - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 3, pp. 323-326

I present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041855

Step thinking and costly coordination

Fatas, Enrique; Morales, Antonio J. - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 181-183

Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678832

Cooperation in and out of markets: An experimental comparison of public good games and markets with externalities

Cherry, Todd L.; Kallbekken, Steffen; Kroll, Stephan; … - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 1, pp. 93-96

Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing cooperation across market and nonmarket settings. This paper reports the results from an experiment that compares behavior in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665690

Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion

Harrington, Joseph E. - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 1, pp. 33-36

This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784968

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Next
Last