We consider a cheap talk model with the sender’s exit option. We show that in the case of discrete action space, it can be the case that there exists an informative equilibrium if and only if the sender’s bias is sufficiently small or sufficiently large. The latter case is sharply...

I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011).

We study the provision of a public good in a social network where links are directed, i.e., the information flows one way. Our results relate, through stochastic dominance, the equilibrium outcome of such a process with the out-degree distribution of the network.

I develop a model where workers decide how hard to look for a job via formal and informal search channels. The intensity of formal search determines an individual’s arrival rate of offers. The strength of investment in informal search translates into a job contact network in which job offers...

We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare...

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more...

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player. Although beliefs may be identical, choices may be different, as not-interacting can lead the long-run player to improve on effort.