Showing 1 - 10 of 87
We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041620
I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576476
We consider a cheap talk model with the sender’s exit option. We show that in the case of discrete action space, it can be the case that there exists an informative equilibrium if and only if the sender’s bias is sufficiently small or sufficiently large. The latter case is sharply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681783
I develop a model where workers decide how hard to look for a job via formal and informal search channels. The intensity of formal search determines an individual’s arrival rate of offers. The strength of investment in informal search translates into a job contact network in which job offers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116225
For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076563
We study the provision of a public good in a social network where links are directed, i.e., the information flows one way. Our results relate, through stochastic dominance, the equilibrium outcome of such a process with the out-degree distribution of the network.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041674
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263395
Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets has become a very important issue in the empirical literature in the last years. We analyze the (private) accident insurance, which has not been analyzed before in the literature, but covers one of the most important risks faced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263404
We provide extensions of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) result when the seller has value for the object above the minimum value of the buyers. The result may fail. We show that the seller does better with more participation and some exclusion than the optimal exclusion of buyers of low value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263431
I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263449