We study the determinants of the (steady-state) POUM effect in a model where the individuals evaluate their expected future income using both their current income and observable characteristics such as education, race or gender.

This paper examines how a religious festival (Ramadan) and the degree of religiosity affect cooperation and costly punishment in a public goods experiment. We find significantly higher cooperation levels outside the festival among less religious people. This behavior is consistent with a...

The restart effect occurs in linear voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiments when there is an upward pulse in contributions to the group account following a stoppage and then restarting of the VCM experiment. Although the restart effect is a well-known empirical regularity little...

We report the results of experiments designed to investigate the effects of random public revelation of individual choices on voluntary contributions to a public good. Varying the number of subjects whose contributions are made public, we find that public revelation always leads to higher...

I examine two dimensions of framing in public goods games: Contributing vs. Taking and Gains vs. Losses. I find decreased cooperation under the Taking frame, but not under the Loss frame. This framing effect is stronger for men than women.

We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that in an incomplete contracting framework, the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their...

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

This paper explains the provision of private rent to powerful members in an organization as an outcome of a contest for power that raises the total contributions to the organization. A necessary condition for a socially efficient contest scheme with reimbursements is characterized.

We construct a theoretically-motivated model of income inequality. Through a pooled regression on an international panel, we demonstrate that political regime (whether extractive, redistributive, or reinvestment-oriented) correlates with within-country income inequality.