This article examines the effects of a tax on vacant dwellings. I use a search equilibrium model in which the distribution of rent is the result of the owners’ posting strategy. I show that this tax reduces the number of vacant dwellings and increases the average rent.

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.

If a positive proportion of traders are naive (i.e., honestly reveal their types and bid/ask truthfully), then efficiency increases in a double auction with preplay communication. Presence of naive traders induces strategic traders to decrease the misrepresentation of their private information.

A restricted-perceptions equilibrium exists in which risk-averse agents believe stock prices follow a random walk with a conditional variance that is self-fulfilling. When agents estimate risk, bubbles and crashes arise. These effects are stronger when agents allow for ARCH in excess returns.

Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given specification of posteriors of different players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the...