This paper examines the effects of charter schools on student achievement at neighboring traditional schools. The study shows that charter school entry does not induce indirect impact on non-overlapping grades but generates positive direct impact on overlapping grades. I also demonstrate that...

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG)...

Why do some participants in online auctions place their bids right before the time of closing? Using e-Bay data, we propose count-data models to look at both the presence of the late-bidding phenomenon and its intensity. Our results reveal significant differences between extremely late-bidders...

Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing cooperation across market and nonmarket settings. This paper reports the results from an experiment that compares behavior in...

I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium).

With nondistortionary user charges, the first best and second best of a single-club-exogenous-income economy with identical individuals coincide. They differ if incomes differ. Overprovision of a superior club good then occurs in the Second Best.

We model a single-club-heterogeneous-consumer-exogeneous-income economy as an aggregative public good game. Under common assumptions, if club quality functions are homogeneous of positive degree in the club facility investment and use, an unique Nash equilibrium exists.

Catholic schools compete with public schools but may also cream-skim. The endogeneity of private school enrollment necessitates 2SLS. Measures of Catholic sex abuse scandals instrument for Catholic school enrollment. We find that competition from Catholic schools raises public school test scores.

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

We investigate a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition. We find that, a welfare-maximizing public enterprise always engages in misleading advertising and that, an increase in the number of firms increases the profit and advertising level of each private firm.