We consider how parties’ formal contracts are underpinned by their ongoing relationship and how welfare changes as the legal system improves. Regardless of impatience, the parties write formal contracts that they would not honor–despite stipulated penalties–if they interacted only once....

Working with a unique neighborhood homicide dataset from 2008 to 2010, this paper makes two contributions. First, we capture the importance of the spatial dependence on homicide rates within large urban center neighborhoods. Second, we measure the influence of spatial dependence more precisely...

We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases.

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

Empirical studies have found that increasing the probability of punishment has a greater effect on crime than the severity of punishment. This note explains this as the result of criminals having imperfect information on their criminal ability. As they commit crimes, they update their estimates...

The paper investigates the influence of path dependence on corruption in Russian regions. We show that even twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, regions with a higher share of Communist Party members in the 1970s have substantially higher corruption.

Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which “supervisors” evaluate the performance...

We argue that subsidized food distribution systems that fail to publicize how much food has been allocated to each local market will experience high rates of theft on the margin as they are expanded. We provide the first comparable cross-section of estimates of subsidized food theft. As...

This study finds that countries with high-IQ populations enjoy less corruption. I propose that this is because intelligent people have longer time horizons.

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regression method. We show that foreign aid generally reduces corruption, and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries. Moreover, this effect is different by different donor countries.