A group of agents must decide whether or not to undertake a project. A simple mechanism is presented which implements the social choice function when the cost-sharing rule fulfills only two properties: budget balance and payment bounds.

This paper presents a simple twofold mechanism that attains a complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution. The first component is adopted from Duggan and Roberts [Duggan, J., Roberts, J., 2002. Implementing the efficient allocation of pollution. American Economic Review 92,...

A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than -[epsilon], where [epsilon] can be arbitrarily small.

We propose to mitigate child labor by encouraging temporary emigration. It emerges that the remittances sent by the emigrating parents might enable not only their children, but also others, to stop working even upon the return of the emigrant parents.