A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in policy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of profit-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when firms pursue other plausible goals....

The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large.

We show that, in general, consistent estimates of cost pass-through are not obtained from reduced-form regressions of price on cost. We derive a formal approximation for the bias that arises even under standard orthogonality conditions. We provide guidance on the conditions under which bias may...

We use data from approximately 50,000 crowdfunding projects to assess the relative funding performance of for-profit and non-profit campaigns. We find that non-profit projects are significantly more likely to reach their minimum funding goals and that they receive more money from the average...

Existing hedonic methods cannot be easily adapted to estimate willingness to pay for product characteristics when willingness to pay depends on a very large basket of goods. We show how to marry these methods with revealed preference arguments to estimate bounds on willingness to pay using data...

Despite a well-developed literature on implications of multimarket contact among firms for performance in domestic markets, only recently has theoretical and empirical work turned to similar issues in international trade. In this paper, I consider the possibility that exporters meeting rivals in...

This paper studies the discriminatory pricing of an intermediate good and compares two models with a different timing of investments undertaken by the downstream firms, before or after the upstream monopolist sets the input prices. When the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher...

Movie theater chains are ubiquitous in major metropolitan areas of the US, with generally two or more of these large chains present. However in smaller metropolitan areas, we see far more variation in the role of these chains. This allows for an opportunity to see whether multimarket contact...

We analyze a model of competition in non-linear pricing under complete information. Among the equilibria of the game, we focus on the truthful equilibrium and the equilibrium that is Pareto dominant for the firms. These coincide when there are only two firms, but differ with three or more firms....

We propose a dynamic model of a patent portfolio race in an industry in which innovation is incremental. Two firms compete in prices and in research. We study the Markov perfect (closed-loop) equilibrium of the resulting differential game, identifying a steady state in which firms compete neck...