This paper examines asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that link life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. This analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, it is observable. We study how the two scenarios differ. Specifically, the principal...

This paper shows that positive correlation between project outcomes may improve the efficiency of microfinance group lending contracts.

Using a within-student analysis, we find no average impact of textbook access (ownership or sharing) on primary school achievement. Instead, it is only for students with high socioeconomic status that one form of textbook access–sharing–has a positive impact.

We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare...

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more...

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player. Although beliefs may be identical, choices may be different, as not-interacting can lead the long-run player to improve on effort.

We consider a two-player all-pay auction with symmetric independent private values that are uniformly distributed. The designer chooses the size of a head start that is given to one of the players. The designer’s objective is to maximize a convex combination of the expected highest effort and...

We provide a full dynamic analysis of a continuous-time variant of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) matching and bargaining model with unbalanced flows of buyers and sellers. The focus is on the price limit as the frictions of search are removed. It is found that a necessary and sufficient...