We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.

I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium....

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...

In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win. We have a simpler model...

This paper argues that Rock–Scissors–Paper is a stochastic game with discounting. Provided that the discount factor is less than 1, it has an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This result contrasts with the one-shot normal form game, which is the customary representation of...

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.